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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890509-CA
Priority No. 2

DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Unlawful
Distribution and Agreeing to Distribute, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989)
(effective until July 1, 1990), in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUNSO 1990"
THE STATE OF UTAH,

.on#n

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890509-CA
Priority No. 2

DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In response to the State's argument that Defendant/
Appellant Darrin L. Pelton directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug
dealer, Appellant Pelton refers this Court to the Statement of the
Facts submitted by the State wherein it acknowledged that Lorraine
Coates, the party actually responsible for arranging the
transaction, directed Acosta to Paco when she "called Paco over" to
Acosta's car. Appellant Pelton directed Acosta to a 7-Eleven but,
upon their arrival, nothing Pelton did or said was shown to have
linked Paco to Acosta.

Lorraine Coates "arranged" the drug

transaction by introducing and directing Acosta to Paco.

^LIZABjfTH^C. BOWMAN
Attorney'ror Defendant/Appellant

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890509-CA
Priority No. 2

DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, issues, the case, the facts, and the
summary of the argument.

Appellant responds to the State7s answer

to his opening brief as follows:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A CONVICTION.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
The State and Appellant Pelton generally agree on the facts
presented at trial.

Compare Appellee's brief at 3-4 with

Appellant's brief at 2-6.

One key exception, though, focuses on who

ultimately directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug dealer.
brief, the State argued:
Defendant's acts in furtherance of the
distribution of the cocaine were to direct the
narcotics agent to the person who would eventually

In its

take the buy money, purchase the cocaine, and
deliver the drug to the agent. Defendant entered
Agent Acosta's car at a meeting point and directed
the agent to another place where they would "call
somebody and they would bring cocaine to us
[Acosta and defendant] there." (T.Tr. at 8 ) .
Defendant traveled with Agent Acosta to the next
meeting place, left Acosta's vehicle and
approached the man who eventually secured the drug
(T.Tr. at 8-9) . The fact that defendants
involvement ceased at that point is attributable
to Agent Acosta's request that defendant no longer
be involved. (T.Tr. at 9-10). The fact that
defendant directed Agent Acosta to the drug dealer
and that defendant approached the dealer before
the dealer contacted Acosta support[ed] the
verdict of the trial court.
Appellee's brief at 8-9.

The State also repeatedly argued that

defendant Pelton directed Agent Acosta to Paco, the drug dealer.
Appellee's brief at 8-10.

Absent from these arguments, however,

were the following facts conceded by the State:
After defendant and Baker spoke to Paco, Agent
Acosta told the informant to call Coates over to
Acosta7s car. (T.Tr. at 9). Acosta told her
[Coates] that he was "uncomfortable with having
[defendant] and [Baker] with [him]." (T.Tr. at 9 ) .
She [Coates1 told Acosta that she understood and
called Paco over . . . .
Appellee's brief at 4 (emphasis added).
The role of Lorraine Coates cannot be ignored.
Pelton, directed and introduced Paco to Acosta.

Coates, not

Without her

participation, the drug transaction would not have occurred.

On the

other hand, either because of her involvement at the 7-Eleven due to
the request by Agent Acosta or because Pelton had no involvement in
the actual drug deal, the actions of Darrin Pelton failed to meet
the proscribed standard for "arranging" the distribution of a
controlled substance.

- 2 -

The court below did not dispute that "The deal still
happens between Lorraine [Coates] and Paco.

And it's Paco who tells

them [Acosta and his informant] where to go, not Mr. Pelton."
(T 42) . Pelton did not direct Paco to Acosta.

Despite

acknowledging this fact, the court went on to find that "maybe you
could have let [Lorraine] Coates out of this and he [Pelton] would
have been there and it still would have gone down with the action
which he took."

(T 47).

The court erred in its finding because

nothing happened with the actions taken by Pelton which linked him
to the drug deal.
a 7-Eleven.

At Pelton's request, the parties simply drove to

Lorraine Coates, acting independently of Pelton,

directed Paco to Acosta.
It is significant as well that the trial court found the
drug transaction might have occurred even without Coates.

The trial

court incorrectly applied a less than beyond a reasonable doubt
standard to the evidence in assessing the testimony.
When Pelton met Agent Acosta, he got into Acosta's car and
told him "that they would have to drive to a 7-Eleven . . . and 'the
man would bring cocaine to that location./M

Appellee's brief at

3-4; (T 8, 18). Upon their arrival at the 7-Eleven, nobody brought
them cocaine.

In fact nothing happened until "Agent Acosta told the

informant to call Coates over to Acosta's car."1

1

Appellee's brief

In addition to downplaying Agent Acosta's role of
reinitiating the entire "sting" operation, the State disagrees with
another element of the causation issue: Appellant Pelton's use of a
"'but for' test for determining that a person arranged to distribute
a controlled substance." Appellee's brief at 9. The State contends
(continued)
- 3 -

at 4; (T.Tr. at 9).

Acosta may have also told Coates that he was

uncomfortable with the presence of Baker and Pelton, (T 9), but that
fact is irrelevant for the sufficiency of the evidence analysis.

As

the State acknowledged, after Coates came over to Acosta7s vehicle,
"She told Acosta that she understood and called Paco over . . . ."
Appellee's brief at 4; (T 9).

Independent of any action by Pelton,

Paco came over, told Acosta that there was no cocaine, and directed
him to the appropriate location across town where a drug deal took

(footnote 1 continued)
that, "Nothing requires that a person's actions be so integral to
the distribution that the distribution could not occur without that
person's participation. Any knowledgable lending of aid, in
whatever form, is sufficient for conviction." Appellee's brief at
9-10.
Appellant Pelton discigrees. In order to be an
"accomplice," a person must do more than simply fall under a literal
reading of the statute. U.C.A. § 76-2-202 (an accomplice is one
"who solicits, requests, commeinds, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person" in the commission of an offense). At first blush,
this statute would appear to make a purchaser of narcotics liable as
an accomplice to the crime of distributing a controlled substance.
The purchaser "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids" the distribution by buying from the seller. A
second review of the statute, however, reveals that "[t]he purchaser
of narcotics is not an accomplice of the seller, as the offense of
the purchaser is "possession" and not "selling." State v. Kasai,
495 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1972).
Similarly, if the terms "intentional aid" or "any act in
furtherance thereof" were in fact proper interpretions and
expansions of the "arranging" statute, they should not have been
applied to the actions of Appellant Pelton. Allowing the court to
apply a literal reading of the statute to the case at bar would also
allow it to apply the statute to an individual who assists a known
drug dealer change a tire in order to obtain cocaine. Even if the
tire-changer knows about the impending transaction and specifically
acts in furtherance of obtaining the drugs, the tire-changer would
not be considered an "accomplice" even though his actions
"intentionally aided" the transaction. Cf. Kasai, 495 P.2d at 12 66;
see also Appellant's brief at 16.
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place.

(MS 36); (T 9-10).
Paco would not have approached Acosta without the prompting

of Lorraine Coates.

Paco did not approach Acosta based upon the

actions taken by Pelton.

If Pelton had acted in furtherance of the

drug transaction, the State would have had to prove Paco acted at
Pelton's direction.

The State could not prove any nexus between

Pelton and Paco as it related to the transaction.

According to the

State, "[a]t the 7-Eleven, defendant [Pelton] and Baker go out of
the vehicle and walked to the telephone booths where they approached
a man who was using the telephone (T.Tr. at 8-9 and 19-20).
man was later identified as Paco (T.Tr. at 9).

That

After defendant and

Baker spoke with Paco, Agent Acosta told the informant to call
Coates over to Acosta's car (T.Tr. at 9)."

Appellee's brief at 4.

Agent Acosta, still seated in his car, did not hear any of
the conversation between Paco and Pelton.

(T 27).

The court

incorrectly inferred that Paco and Pelton had in fact discussed the
drug transaction when there was no testimony to support this
conclusion.

Pelton did not arrange the transaction.

If Pelton did

make an arrangement with Paco, Paco would have approached Acosta at
Pelton's direction.

Instead of an introduction of Paco to Acosta by

Pelton, however, nothing happened at Pelton's hand.

After his

conversation with Paco, Pelton walked over to a pick-up truck.
(T 20).

He did not return to Acosta's car nor did he introduce or

direct Acosta to Paco.

(T 20).

As the State noted, "defendant's

involvement ceased at that point . . . ." Appellee's brief at 9.
Pelton's statements directing the agent to a 7-Eleven where no

- 5 -

transaction occurred did not constitute culpable conduct.

Lorraine

Coates is the person responsible for finding, directing, and
introducing Acosta—at his urging—to Paco.

POINT II
THE SUBSTANCE OF APPELLANTS ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE
STATUTE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO HIM.
(Reply to Points II & III)
The State submits that "[t]he record in the present [case]
is devoid of any claim below that the arranging statute was
unconstitutionally applied to defendant [Pelton].11

Appellee's brief

at 11. The record below, however, does include Pelton7s "Trial
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss."
(R 50-56).

Therein, Pelton denied that he ever "offered, agreed,

consented to, or arranged that transaction or distributed the
substance or possessed a controlled substance . . . [in violation of
U.C.A. §] 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) . . . ."

(R 52).

After listing various

opinions addressing the breadth of the statute, Pelton also noted
that "there is no evidence to support a conviction for arranging or
distribution under subsection (ii)."

(R 55).

The essense of Pelton's argument was that the statute did
not apply to him.

If Pelton7s actions did not fall under the

language of an inapplicable statute nor within the parameters of the
listed opinions, the reach of the statute could not constitutionally
encompass the case at bar without unduly broadening the meaning and
application of the statute.

Pelton argued that the statute did not

- 6 -

apply to him in his "Trial Memorandum/1 (R 50-56) , and, again, at
trial:
He [Pelton] didn't participate. He didn't
facilitate. He didn't arrange. He didn't discuss
prices. And as I have indicated, nothing regarding
the deal was within his control: where the deal
took place, what the deal was about, how much money
was involved, none of that. At least some of that
would have to be involved for |*a1 conviction
funder] the arranging subsection.
(T 40) (emphasis added).

While Appellant Pelton admits that, at

trial, he did not use the exact words argued on appeal, the
substance of his argument nonetheless remains the same.
As noted previously, Appellant's brief at 15, the
applicable statute made it unlawful only if a person agreed,
consented. offered, arranged, or negotiated the distribution of a
controlled substance.

U.C.A. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). The statute does

not prohibit "any act in furtherance thereof" or "any intentional
aid."
8.

Compare Appellant's brief at 14-17 with Appellee's brief at

If the legislature had intended to proscribe "any activity," it

would have inserted those words into the statute and deleted the
five terms currently in their place.
Since the legislature did not prohibit "any act in
furtherance thereof," any judicial expansion of the proscribed
statutory language was improper.

"[I]t is for the legislature, not

the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct."

State v.

Green, No. 890222 (Utah App. May 23, 1990) (construing State v.
Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant, Darrin Lamar Pelton,
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court for dismissal.
SUBMITTED this

/jy day of June, 1990.

^ELIZABfeTH y . ^BOWMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RONALD S. vFUqiNO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
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four copies to the Attorney General7s Office, 236 State Capitol,
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day of June, 1990.

RONALD S. FUJINO
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ADDENDUM A

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until
July 1, 1990) provides in pertinent part:
(1)

Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989) provides in
pertinent part:
(1)

Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it shall
be unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute or dispense a controlled
substance for value or to negotiate to have a
controlled substance distributed or dispensed
for value.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminallv IIAMP «<*

